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Leading from the Front: The ‘Service Members’ in Parliament, the Armed Forces, and 
British Politics during the Great War
*
 
 
 
The European war that broke out in the summer of 1914 was widely seen in Britain not 
simply as a contest of strength between the Great Powers, but as an ideological struggle 
against ‘Prussian militarism’. The violation of Belgian neutrality, which provided the formal 
British casus belli in August 1914, was seen as symptomatic of a more fundamental problem 
that was apparent in the politics of the German empire—the elevation of military power over 
constitutional government and the rule of law.
1
 This, of course, represented a very particular 
understanding of ‘militarism’. In terms of expenditure on armaments during the early 
twentieth century, Britain herself could be regarded as one of the most ‘militaristic’ powers in 
Europe.
2
 But militarism as a problem of civil-military relations was widely seen as a 
peculiarly ‘German’ phenomenon. The legacy of the Prussian army crisis of the 1860s had 
ensured that the armed forces of the German Reich remained a powerful caste, effectively a 
‘state within the state’, answerable to the Kaiser alone and able to flout the authority of 
parliaments.
3
 Britain, by contrast, appeared by the early twentieth century to stand as the 
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exemplar of the civilian and constitutional state—a polity in which the armed forces were 
clearly subordinate to the authority of civilian statesmen in Parliament.
4
 
 
Soldiers did occasionally rise to positions of political authority in Britain: in 1828, the 
Duke of Wellington made it all the way to the office of prime minister. But such experiences 
were exceptional. Even Herbert Henry Asquith’s widely popular decision to appoint Field 
Marshal Kitchener as Secretary of State for War in August 1914 represented—as the Prime 
Minister was the first to concede—a ‘hazardous experiment’ and a striking departure from 
British constitutional norms.
5
 The Great War presented new problems for civilian authority in 
Britain, and several historians have explored the tensions that emerged between leading 
politicians (most notably David Lloyd George) and the military high command over 
questions of strategy and the direction of the war.
6
 Yet, by concentrating on relations between 
civilian Cabinet ministers and senior generals, these studies have tended, implicitly, to 
reinforce the assumption that the political and military elites in Britain constituted two 
separate and distinct castes. 
 
In fact, the ruling political class in Britain during this period was by no means purely 
‘civilian’ in character. Ennobled soldiers had long sat in the House of Lords, where the close 
connection between the aristocracy and the armed forces was still readily apparent in the 
early twentieth century.
7
 Less frequently acknowledged, however, has been the presence of 
military officers within the House of Commons. In November 1914, just three months after 
                                                          
4
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the outbreak of the war, The Times reported that no fewer than 126 British Members of 
Parliament had volunteered for service in the armed forces.
8
 By January 1915 the number of 
MPs on active service was 184. Altogether, during the war, 264 MPs held military rank in 
some capacity. Among these men were a number of front-rank politicians, including two—
Sir John Simon and Winston Churchill—who began the war as members of the Cabinet. 
 
These ‘Service Members’ occupied a unique and controversial position, both within 
Parliament and in the armed forces, yet they have never been subject to serious historical 
analysis. In fact, their activities had a profound impact on many of the defining problems of 
wartime politics in Britain. As ‘soldiers in Parliament’ they were widely seen as bringing a 
military perspective—and, more controversially, a military agenda—into the House of 
Commons, with significant consequences for both the shaping of legislation and the operation 
of party politics. At the same time, as ‘politicians in uniform’ they occupied an anomalous 
position in the military hierarchy—one which potentially allowed them to act as instruments 
of parliamentary control over the armed forces. This had important (and destabilising) 
implications for the operation of civil–military relations in Britain which have been largely 
ignored in the familiar narrative of tensions between Cabinet ‘Frocks’ and the ‘Brass Hats’ on 
the General Staff. More striking still were the contributions of these men to a number of 
broader political and constitutional controversies during the war. The most significant of 
these concerned questions about the workings of representative politics and the nature of 
political citizenship. Historical analyses of wartime debates about electoral reform in Britain 
have typically focused either on the process of partisan political manoeuvre that shaped the 
1918 Representation of the People Act, or on wider questions about the relationship between 
the experience of war and the achievement of women’s suffrage. As this article will 
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demonstrate, however, these debates were also heavily influenced by the promotion of an 
explicitly militarised conception of citizenship, articulated most forcefully by self-proclaimed 
‘representatives’ of the armed forces in Parliament. In turn, by conflating arguments about 
political representation with self-conscious assertions of the army’s right to influence 
Parliament, these political interventions fed into broader concerns about the authority and 
independence of British political institutions during the war. These concerns had profound 
implications for both the maintenance of civilian morale and the preservation of political 
stability, and this article therefore concludes by exploring the paradoxical ways in which the 
activities of Service Members came to be seen simultaneously as a threat to the autonomy of 
the House of Commons, and as essential to the preservation of Parliament’s authority as a 
‘representative’ institution. 
  
I 
The presence of military officers in the House of Commons during the Great War was not, of 
course, unprecedented. After the political upheavals of the Civil War and the Cromwellian 
Protectorate during the mid-seventeenth century, army officers had been a controversial 
presence in the parliaments of the later Stuart kings, where they operated essentially as royal 
placemen. Soldiers accounted for some 8 to 10 per cent of the membership of the House of 
Commons for most of the eighteenth century, and almost 20 per cent during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars with France. The number of military officers in 
Parliament declined during the nineteenth century, however, and in 1868 there were just 
thirty-four MPs who had served or were still serving in the regular army.
9
 Dozens of MPs 
took military commissions during the war in South Africa between 1899 and 1902, but the 
                                                          
9
 Strachan, Politics of the British Army, pp. 26–30. Many more Victorian and Edwardian MPs could boast a 
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number serving in the forces during the Great War—accounting for some 40 per cent of the 
membership of the House of Commons—was unprecedented, and represented a remarkable 
political development. 
 
The military service undertaken by these men took a variety of forms. The Royal 
Navy, despite its traditional status as the ‘senior service’ in Britain, was poorly represented in 
the wartime House of Commons, following a pattern already well established during the 
nineteenth century. Those naval officers who did sit as MPs tended to represent dockyard 
towns, as, for example, in the case of Admiral Sir Hedworth Meux, who was returned for 
Portsmouth in a by-election in 1916.
10
 A handful of MPs, including F.W.S. McLaren, Sir 
John Simon, and Lord Hugh Cecil, would serve in the new Royal Flying Corps. The 
overwhelming majority of Great War Service Members, however, were to be found in the 
army. In January 1916 the War Office published a list of 164 MPs serving with the forces at 
that time. Of these men, 114 were regimental officers in fighting formations; six were staff 
officers; four were with the Army Service Corps; and another twenty-six were employed in 
military training, administration, supply, or recruiting. A further ten MPs were employed in 
Intelligence work or on ‘Special Service’; two were serving in the Royal Army Medical 
Corps; Hugh Cecil had already earned his pilot’s wings in the RFC; and one MP, Dr. Charles 
Leach, was listed as a Chaplain to the Forces, 4
th
 Class.
11
 MPs served in all of the major 
theatres of the war; nineteen were killed in action, and many more were wounded.
12
 Service 
Members were almost invariably commissioned officers. The January 1916 War Office list 
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 Meux’s predecessor as MP for Portsmouth had been Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, the former commander-
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 Hansard, The Official Report, House of Commons, 5th ser. [hereafter Hansard, Commons], 6 Jan. 1916, vol. 
77, cols. 1118–24. 
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 The MPs killed while on service were: T.C.R. Agar-Robartes, G.V. Baring, F. Bennett-Goldney, D.F. 
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Gladstone, P.K. Glazebrook, M.H. Hicks Beach, F.W.S. McLaren, C.T. Mills, A.E.B. O’Neill, N. Primrose, 
W.H.K. Redmond, A. Thynne, and W.L.C. Walrond. 
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included six generals, six colonels, thirty-seven lieutenant-colonels, fifty-nine majors, forty 
captains and thirteen lieutenants. Hastings Bertrand Lees Smith, the Liberal MP for 
Northampton, was the only Service Member listed who did not hold a commission; he was a 
corporal in the Royal Army Medical Corps. A handful of other MPs had enlisted in the ranks 
earlier in the war, but these men had usually secured remarkably rapid promotion.
13
 
 
Some of the MPs who served in the forces during the Great War could boast a military 
background prior to 1914. Sixty-two had served in South Africa during the Anglo-Boer 
conflict of 1899–1902, and many of these veterans had retained commissions in the 
Territorial Force or Special Reserve during the following decade.
14
 Thirty-one military or 
naval officers were elected to Parliament during the Great War itself, including Major-
General John Humphrey Davidson, Field Marshal Haig’s director of military operations, who 
was elected MP for Fareham in July 1918. A remarkable number of wartime Service 
Members, however, were essentially civilian politicians for whom the Great War represented 
their first experience of military service. Many of these men attempted to secure commissions 
by exploiting personal contacts within the military or political establishment, and a number of 
                                                          
13
 Sir Herbert Raphael, for example, a wealthy baronet and the Liberal MP for South Derbyshire, briefly came to 
enjoy some fame as the ‘millionaire private’ after joining the ranks of the Royal Fusiliers in February 1915, but 
within four months he had received a temporary commission as a major in the King’s Royal Rifle Corps. See 
The National Archives [hereafter TNA], WO 339/50142, Personnel file of Sir H.H. Raphael; Times, 10 Feb. 
1915; Argus, 9 April 1915. 
14
 One of these, the Irish Nationalist Arthur Alfred Lynch, had fought on the side of the Boers, as colonel of the 
2
nd
 Irish Brigade. The others were W. Anstruther-Grey, M. Archer-Shee, G.V. Baring, C.R. Burn, D.F. 
Campbell, R.G.W. Chaloner, W.L.S. Churchill, P.A. Clive, R.B. Colvin, J. Craig, J.J. Dalrymple, J.H. 
Davidson, W.B. Du Pre, E.E. Fiennes, G.A. Gibbs, J. Gilmour, W.R. Greene, J.N. Griffiths, C.H.C. Guest, F.E. 
Guest, R.E.C.L. Guinness, W.E. Guinness, C. Heathcote-Drummond-Willoughby, T.E. Hickman, A. 
Hopkinson, R. Hunt, C.R. Hunter, A.G. Hunter-Weston, P. Kerr-Smiley, the Earl of Kerry, H. Keswick, E.A. 
Knight, C.W.H. Lowther, H.C. Lowther, J.C. Lyttleton, R.C.A. McCalmont, G. McMicking, F.B. Mildmay, 
A.C. Morrison-Bell, E.F. Morrison-Bell, A.E.B. O’Neill, A.G.V. Peel, R.F. Peel, D.V. Pirie, R. Pole-Carew, 
G.J. Sandys, S.E. Scott, J.E.B. Seely, H.H. Spender-Clay, A. Stirling, T.B.M. Sykes, A. Thynne, G.C. Tryon, 
the Marquess of Tullibardine, W. Waring, J.C. Wedgwood, W.E.G.A. Weigall, G. Dalrymple-White, G.G. 
Wilson, L.O. Wilson and M.R.H. Wilson. Two other Boer War veterans sitting in the House of Commons in 
1914—Sir Ivor Herbert and Viscount Valentia—held honorary military commissions during the Great War but 
did not see active service. 
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military units acquired something of a political flavour during the war.
15
 The 36
th
 (Ulster) 
Division, for example, which was created in September 1914 following intensive political 
lobbying of Kitchener, counted a number of Unionist political figures among its officers, 
including several who had been members of the pre-war Ulster Volunteer Force.
16
 At the 
same time, Lieutenant General Sir Lawrence Parsons, assigned in September 1914 to 
command the 16
th
 (Irish) Division, came under strong pressure to appoint Irish Nationalist 
MPs as officers under him, on the grounds that this might encourage Irish enlistment.
17
 The 
38
th
 (Welsh) Division boasted several Liberal MPs as officers, including Ivor Philipps, whose 
appointment as major-general commanding the division appears to have been the result of 
direct intervention by Lloyd George, in return for Philipps taking Lloyd George’s son 
Gwilym as his aide-de-camp.
18
 One particularly generous patron of MPs seeking 
commissions was Winston Churchill who, as First Lord of the Admiralty in the Liberal 
Cabinet, was responsible not only for the fleet, but for the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal 
Naval Volunteer Reserve, and the new Royal Naval Division, which soon found itself 
deployed to Antwerp in an attempt to slow the German advance through Belgium. Josiah 
Wedgwood, MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme, later recalled how Churchill ‘showered 
commissions on Members of the House of Commons to lead his amphibian Forces, till the 
War Office, in sheer self-defence, had to do the same’.19  
                                                          
15
 See, for example, King’s College London, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Ian Hamilton Papers, 
fol. 6/3, W. Faber to Hamilton, 18 Aug. 1914; fol. 6/11, L.S. Amery to Hamilton, 5 Jan. 1915; and London, 
Courtauld Institute of Art, Arthur Lee Papers, Box 2, undated note by Lee. 
16
 T. Bowman, ‘Officering Kitchener’s Armies: A Case Study of the 36th (Ulster) Division’, War in History, xvi, 
no. 2 (2009), pp. 198, 201, 210. 
17
 Stephen Lucius Gwynn, William Hoey Kearney Redmond, and Daniel Desmond Sheehan were all 
commissioned in the 16
th
 Division. See T. Denman, Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers: The 16th (Irish) Division in the 
Great War, 1914–1918 (Dublin, 1992), p. 47. 
18
 C. Hughes, Mametz: Lloyd George’s ‘Welsh Army’ at the Battle of the Somme (Norwich, 1990), pp. 21–7. 
19
 J.C. Wedgwood, Testament to Democracy (London, 1942), p. 39. At least twenty MPs were offered 
commissions in the forces administered by Churchill during the early months of the war: A.C.T. Beck, I.H. 
Benn, H.J. Craig, N.C. Craig, J.A. Dawes, E.E. Fiennes, M.A. de Forest, G.A. France, R.V. Harcourt, F.L. 
Harris, G.W.A. Howard, O.S. Locker-Lampson, F.W.S. McLaren, W. Mitchell-Thomson, L.G. Chiozza Money, 
H. Smith, W. Dudley Ward, J.C. Wedgwood, A.F. Whyte, and L.O. Wilson. Another MP, Rupert Guinness, had 
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The spectacle of Members of Parliament apparently receiving favourable treatment in 
the distribution of military commissions provoked resentment in some quarters. The selection 
of the former Liberal Cabinet minister J.E.B. Seely to command the Canadian cavalry brigade 
in France was criticised by Unionists who felt that the appointment must have been ‘due to 
politics’, and Walter Long complained that the War Office had been ‘gravely, unduly remiss, 
in allowing these plums of the Army to be given to these men who are only amateurs, instead 
of giving them to professionals’.20 One critic sarcastically suggested the creation of a special 
‘Politicians Brigade’ within the army, in which senior command might alternate between 
Seely and Churchill.
21
  
 
In fact, political influence could cut both ways. While the military careers of some 
Service Members benefitted greatly from an informal system of patronage, others found their 
prospects hindered by interference from their political opponents. Leo Amery, the Unionist 
MP for South Birmingham, found himself removed from the staff of General Rawlinson in 
Flanders, and later from the staff of General Ian Hamilton before the latter’s departure for 
Gallipoli, as a consequence of the disapproval of the (Liberal) Prime Minister Asquith.
22
 In 
the winter of 1915-16, Churchill himself, having resigned from the Cabinet in the wake of the 
Dardenelles disaster a few months earlier, secured from Sir John French, the British 
commander-in-chief, a promise of the command of a brigade in France. Unionist critics, 
already suspicious of Churchill’s pretensions as a military strategist, reacted to rumours of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
already been appointed to command the London Division of the RNVR in 1903, and was promoted to captain in 
1915. 
20
 Hansard, Commons, 11 Mar. 1915, vol. 70, cols. 29, 1581. Seely had previously served in the South African 
War, but his military experience before 1914 had been confined to the Yeomanry rather than the regular army. 
21
 Cambridge, Churchill College, Churchill Archives Centre [hereafter CAC], Winston Churchill papers, CHAR 
2/64/48, H. de. V. Habakkuk-Scrubbs to ‘the Editor-in-Chief’, undated. 
22
 L.S. Amery, My Political Life (3 vols., London, 1953–5), ii. 49. 
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appointment with fury. Sir Evelyn Cecil warned the government that Churchill’s promotion 
to so senior a military post would be widely regarded as a ‘grave scandal’, and Asquith felt 
obliged to veto Churchill’s elevation to brigadier-general, suggesting to French that he be 
appointed to a more junior military post instead. It was therefore only as a lieutenant-colonel 
that Churchill found himself in January 1916 in command of the 6
th
 battalion of the Royal 
Scots Fusiliers on the western front.
23
 
 
Quite apart from the issues raised by their appointment to particular positions of 
responsibility, the presence of the Service Members in Parliament raised difficult 
constitutional questions. The elevation of distinguished military figures to the House of Lords 
generally attracted little controversy, but the presence of serving soldiers in the Commons 
was potentially more problematic. Could a military officer, as a subordinate of the Crown, 
also be a Member of Parliament, and therefore a servant of the people? When this question 
had been raised during the 1880s, the War Secretary, Hugh Childers, and the clerk of the 
House of Commons, Sir Thomas Erskine May, had declined to lay down any definitive 
principle on the matter, treating the problem as one of practicalities. They argued simply that 
the exigencies of military service (which in practice often meant imperial service overseas) 
rendered a political career at Westminster ‘inconvenient’.24 In November 1914, however 
Asquith informed the House of Commons that any MP who took a military commission 
during the war would technically be accepting ‘an office of profit’ under the Crown, and 
would therefore be obliged to vacate his parliamentary seat, in line with the provisions of the 
Succession to the Crown Act of 1707.
25
 Faced with a large number of MPs who had 
unwittingly forfeited their right to sit in the Commons, the government was forced to 
                                                          
23
 London, Imperial War Museum [hereafter IWM], John French papers, JDPF2, fols. 43-4, Asquith to French, 
16 Dec. 1915; Hansard, Commons, 16 Dec. 1915, vol. 76, col. 2219. 
24
 Strachan, Politics of the British Army, p. 31. 
25
 Hansard, Commons, 12 Nov. 1914, vol. 68, cols. 40–41. 
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introduce emergency legislation exempting wartime Service Members from the provisions of 
the 1707 statute.
26
 
 
There remained, however, significant practical difficulties confronting those who 
sought to combine military responsibilities with their political duties in Parliament. In 
December 1915, Captain Stanley Wilson, the Unionist MP for Holderness, was carrying 
military despatches from the Eastern Mediterranean to London when the Greek steamer on 
which he was travelling was intercepted by an Austrian submarine. Wilson was interned in an 
Austrian prisoner-of-war camp, and the electors of Holderness remained effectively 
unrepresented at Westminster until their MP was released in August 1917.
27
 This case was 
perhaps extreme, but the problem of how MPs could continue to represent their constituents 
in Parliament while on active service proved a difficult one to resolve. Some MPs quickly 
reconciled themselves to the fact that the demands of military service might limit their ability 
to attend to political matters at home. In November 1914, Charles Bathurst, the Unionist MP 
for Wilton who had taken a wartime commission in the Royal Monmouthshire Royal 
Engineers, wrote to inform his party leader Andrew Bonar Law that ‘my soldiering shall take 
the precedence of my parliamentary work’ and that he did not expect to attend the House of 
Commons unless his presence should be specifically requested.
28
 Similarly, John Gilmour 
sent a circular letter to his constituents in East Renfrewshire, informing them that he was 
‘relinquishing, for the time being, my Parliamentary duties’, having volunteered for active 
                                                          
26
 Hansard, Commons, 18 Nov. 1914, vol. 68, cols. 529–31. As the Attorney-General Sir John Simon explained, 
the terms of the 1707 statute applied only to sitting MPs who accepted military commissions in the regular 
armed forces. No part of the constitution of the country or the rules of the House of Commons prevented serving 
officers from being elected as MPs, and men who took commissions in the Territorial Force after 1907 were 
deliberately exempted from the provisions of the 1707 Act.  
27
 Times, 10 Jan. 1916. 
28
 London, Parliamentary Archives, Bonar Law Papers, BL/35/2/14, Bathurst to Bonar Law, 8 Nov. 1914. 
 11 
 
service abroad.
29
 Henry Page Croft later claimed that on securing a commission ‘one had 
ceased to be a politician except in name, and thenceforth a soldier’s work called’.30 Some 
Members offered to resign their seats before departing for the front, and in February 1916 
John Lyttelton formally stood down as MP for Droitwich in order to devote himself to his 
military duties.
31
 
 
Not all Service Members, however, were prepared to abandon their political 
responsibilities for the duration of the war. By February 1915 the government was coming 
under pressure to allow MPs absent from the Commons on military service to register votes 
by proxy in important divisions, but these suggestions were rejected by Asquith on the 
grounds that proxy voting would negate Parliament’s function as a deliberative assembly.32 
Service Members who wished to retain some influence over parliamentary proceedings 
would therefore need to attend the House of Commons in person. This was not always 
straightforward, but in practice the military authorities were usually content for MPs to take 
limited periods of leave in order to attend to their duties at Westminster. Indeed, when 
Parliament debated questions seen as vital to the war effort, Service Members often contrived 
to attend the House in considerable numbers. 
 
The presence of uniformed officers in the Commons Chamber raised a number of new 
problems. Should these MPs, for example, be allowed to comment on military operations in 
which they themselves had participated—or even on military questions generally? King’s 
Regulations forbade serving soldiers from publishing, directly or indirectly, ‘any information 
                                                          
29
 Edinburgh, National Archives of Scotland, Gilmour Papers, GD383/11, Circular letter, 14 Sept. 1914. 
30
 H. Page Croft, My Life of Strife (London, 1948), p. 85. Croft in fact returned to the House of Commons during 
the war, after spending ‘twenty-two months under fire’. 
31
 Times, 23 Feb. 1916; Bonar Law Papers, BL/53/5/27, Tullibardine to Bonar Law, undated. 
32
 Hansard¸ Commons, 4 Feb. 1915, vol. 69, col. lxix, 125; 22 Sept. 1915, vol. 74, cols. 450–51. 
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of a professional nature which [they] may acquire while travelling or employed on duty’. 
Regulation 453 also prohibited officers from taking part, ‘in public, in a discussion relating to 
orders, regulations or instructions issued by [their] superiors’.33 But, as the Under-Secretary 
of State for War, H.J. Tennant, noted in June 1915, ‘it has been the immemorial custom to 
consider statements made inside Parliament as privileged’. Traditionally, MPs in the forces 
who wished to attend the House of Commons had circumvented the problem of military 
regulations by being placed on half-pay or being seconded from their units. The sheer number 
of MPs who came forward to serve after August 1914, however, and the nature of the conflict 
in which they were engaged, meant that this practice was abrogated during the Great War. In 
these circumstances the government was reluctant to debar MPs who had patriotically offered 
their military services to the nation from taking part in parliamentary debates on general 
‘questions of policy’. Tennant warned, however, that this indulgence might not extend to the 
discussion of matters such as military discipline. In other words, there were limits to the 
extent to which parliamentary privilege accorded Service Members freedom to speak on 
military questions, although Tennant confessed that defining those limits precisely would be 
as difficult as ‘delimiting the boundaries of good taste’.34 
 
In practice, the government was initially willing to leave this question to the 
discretion of the MPs themselves. During the early months of the war, Service Members 
appeared to regard themselves as bound by a strict interpretation of army regulations, and 
were often reluctant to make public use of knowledge gained in the course of their military 
duties. In May 1915 the Unionist MP Captain Charles Hunter wrote to Bonar Law, 
complaining about the shortage of arms and ammunition supplied to his division. Hunter was 
                                                          
33
 The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army (London, 1912), p. 94. 
34
 Hansard, Commons, 29 June 1915, vol. 72, cols. 1620–1. 
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incensed at what he regarded as the way in which the Liberal government was deliberately 
misleading the public over the equipping of the army, but lamented that ‘in my military 
position, responsible for rifles and ammunition, I cannot of course use this information in 
detail as yet’.35 Two months later, Colonel John Gretton rose in the House of Commons to 
offer comments on the Munitions of War Bill. Gretton declared that he considered himself 
‘precluded from discussing the matter very closely, owing to the fact that I have been in 
military training, have had considerable periods at the Front and in the trenches, and have had 
considerable means of obtaining information at first hand as to how matters stand’. He felt 
able to intervene in this debate, he explained, only because ‘it is a matter of common 
knowledge, and it has been admitted, that munitions have not been dealt with adequately 
hitherto’.36 In other words, Gretton felt able to speak in the House on military questions only 
by circumscribing his own military credentials, and presenting himself as an ‘ordinary’ MP. 
 
Other Service Members, however, were less reticent on this score. During another 
debate on the munitions question, in June 1915, the Liberal MP Captain Freddie Guest 
declared explicitly that he offered his opinion ‘both as a soldier and as a Member of 
Parliament’.37 Returning to the Commons a month later, Guest burnished his military 
credentials further, arguing that in the context of wartime politics ‘an opinion worth 
considering and bearing in mind ... is the opinion of the soldier’, and urging that ‘some 
special use’ should be made of MPs who possessed first-hand military experience, ‘instead of 
being, as it almost appears they are, regarded as a nuisance’.38 In a similar vein, Major 
George Bowden, the Unionist MP for North East Derbyshire, felt himself particularly entitled 
to speak in the Commons during a debate on the Defence of the Realm Bill in May 1915 
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because, as he declared, ‘I speak as a soldier with some capacity to appreciate the military 
situation’.39 
 
The increasing readiness of some Service Members to identify themselves in 
Parliament ‘as soldiers’ was politically significant. Many MPs serving with the forces during 
the war came to adopt political positions that seemed to reflect a distinctly ‘military’ 
perspective on the conflict. Some appeared to have imbibed military values to an extent that 
coloured even their views of civilian society. Bowden, for example, was highly critical of the 
effect that the problem of ‘drink’ was supposedly having on the production of munitions, and 
complained that government proposals to tackle this problem were ‘quite inadequate ... from 
a military point of view’. Declaring that ‘we should not be too squeamish about our methods 
of dealing with the men who have been proved at this time of national danger to be 
deliberately endangering the safety of the nation’, he called for munitions workers to be made 
subject to military law, on the grounds that ‘the military authorities could be trusted to see ... 
that there was no slackness owing to drink’.40 Bowden, of course, belonged to a party which 
had not always been in close sympathy with the labour movement even prior to 1914. During 
the war, however, it was not only Unionist Service Members who could be found urging the 
imposition of military discipline on civilian factory workers. Bowden’s call was soon taken 
up by the left-wing Liberal Josiah Wedgwood, recently returned to the Commons after being 
wounded at Gallipoli, who declared that:  
 
Anti-militarist as I am, I admit that I should like to see them [the workers] 
in uniform ... I should like to see these people, when they are going to the 
workshops, marched there. ... Keep them at work, not seven, eight or twelve 
hours a day, but fifteen hours a day, provide them with food, and let them 
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work, not necessarily for the extra pay it will bring in, but for the sake of 
their country.
41
 
 
Wedgwood’s attitude on this question in 1915 represented a marked departure from the 
independent-minded radical politics with which he had been associated before the war.
42
 
Observers such as Edward Turnour, the Conservative MP for Horsham, who also saw action 
at Gallipoli, believed that Wedgwood had ‘become a patriot’ while in the armed forces.43 Yet 
the apparent adoption of a ‘military’ perspective on important questions during the war did 
not necessarily signify that MPs serving in the forces were simply becoming more ‘right-
wing’ in a traditional sense. Prior to the war, the Unionist Party had been united in its 
condemnation of the ‘socialistic’ assault on property rights which they believed to have 
underpinned the Liberal government’s budget of 1909. After August 1914, however, Unionist 
MPs who were now risking life and limb in the trenches often proved particularly quick to 
embrace a form of ‘war socialism’ that subordinated respect for private property rights to the 
pursuit of victory. In March 1916, Ion Hamilton Benn, an RNVR officer and MP for 
Greenwich, who had been a prominent member of the London branch of the Budget Protest 
League before the war, wrote to Bonar Law to complain that British shipping policy was 
being ‘muddled and mismanaged’. Revealingly, Benn attributed these problems to ‘an 
exaggerated respect for property’, and demanded of his party leader: ‘Why should one man 
have to fight, lose his life, let his business go bankrupt, leave his widow in poverty and his 
children dependent on charity, while another must have his profits guaranteed before the 
essentials of victory may be required of him?’44 Leo Amery similarly urged the government 
to place vital war industries under state control, where profits as well as wages would be 
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fixed.
45
 Hostility towards war ‘profiteers’ was widespread in British society by this time, but 
many Unionists remained wary of calls for the ‘conscription of wealth’.46 Support from 
Service Members such as Benn and Amery for greater state direction of the economy during 
the war thus fed into a wider, contentious and continuing debate on the political right about 
the merits and problems of economic collectivism.
47
 
 
As the war progressed, the extent to which first-hand experience of military service 
was shaping the political attitudes of individual MPs became increasingly apparent. In turn, 
the activities of Service Members in Parliament were to have a profound effect on the wider 
political landscape—and, in particular, on the operation of party politics at Westminster. Of 
the 264 MPs who served in the forces during the war, 185 were Unionists, sixty-six were 
Liberals, seven were Irish Nationalists, four were members of the Labour Party, and two sat 
as Independents. The disproportionate number of Unionists among the ranks of the Service 
Members is unsurprising. The Unionist Party had long regarded itself as the party of British 
(or at least English) patriotism and traditionally boasted strong links with the armed forces. 
During the early months of the war, Unionist party managers actively encouraged MPs to 
regard their military responsibilities as paramount, and Edmund Talbot, the Chief Whip, let it 
be known that Members serving with the forces would not be required to attend Parliament.
48
 
Yet the departure of large numbers of Unionist MPs for the theatre of war also created 
potential problems for the party at Westminster. Following the general elections of 1910 the 
strength of the Liberal and Unionist parties in the House of Commons had been finely 
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balanced. By January 1915, however, ninety-eight Unionists had joined the colours, 
compared to twenty-nine Liberals, and senior figures within the party were expressing alarm 
at the ‘weakness of the Opposition in Parliament caused by the War’.49 
 
The political significance of the Service Members was not felt simply—or even 
primarily—in terms of the balance of strength between Liberals and Unionists in the House 
of Commons. Their influence also proved to be important in the context of the shifting 
internal dynamics of the parties during the war. Fighting MPs were prominent in the ‘ginger 
groups’ that sprang up in both the Unionist and Liberal parties to promote a more vigorous 
prosecution of the war effort, and often operated beyond the control of the leaders of their 
parties. In January 1916, the Nation observed that the ‘Khaki brigade’ on the Unionist 
benches in the Commons was providing conspicuous support for the Unionist War 
Committee (UWC)—an organisation of backbench MPs, led by Sir Edward Carson, who 
were strongly critical of what they regarded as Bonar Law’s failure to promote a more 
energetic war policy.
50
 Service Members were also prominent among the leadership of the 
UWC’s Liberal counterpart, the Liberal War Committee, which repeatedly complained about 
Asquith’s shortcomings as a war leader, and would eventually form the core of the Liberal 
parliamentary support for David Lloyd George after he supplanted Asquith as premier, with 
Unionist support, in December 1916.
51
 In August 1917 a group of six fighting MPs formed 
the core of a new ‘National Party’, an ultranationalist, imperialist, and ‘anti-corruption’ right-
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wing organisation led by Brigadier General Sir Henry Page Croft, which broke away from the 
official Unionist Party.
52
 
 
At the same time, the activities of Service Members had an important effect on 
relations between the major parties. British politics in the years preceding 1914 had been 
unusually polarised and partisan. Following the outbreak of the war, however, an electoral 
truce was arranged between the parties, and in May 1915 Asquith announced the creation of a 
coalition government. With the normal rules of party politics thus to some extend suspended 
during the war, military service could provide a common identity, and even a basis for 
common action, for MPs from rival parties. Nine Service Members—six Unionists and three 
Liberals—were among the founding members of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, a 
cross-party organisation formed in March 1915, which campaigned| to ensure that ‘the grave 
issues of the War should be fully comprehended by the people and thereby give a powerful 
impetus to recruiting’.53 More controversially, in the summer of 1915 the Liberal Freddie 
Guest and a handful of his parliamentary colleagues serving in the armed forces launched a 
secret initiative to rally fighting MPs from all parties behind a campaign to pressure the 
government into introducing compulsory military service. Once sufficient support from MPs 
in the field had been secured, Guest proposed, these men should arrange to take a week’s 
leave and return en masse to the House of Commons to force a debate on the question.
54
 
Pressure was also to be brought to bear outside of Parliament. During August and September 
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1915 a considerable number of Service Members signed manifestoes calling for compulsory 
military service, which were then published in national newspapers. Many also delivered 
public speeches on the subject across the country, often while wearing military uniform.
55
 
 
When the government finally brought a Military Service Bill before the Commons in 
January 1916, proposing compulsory service for unmarried men between the ages of eighteen 
and forty-one, 114 of the 164 MPs listed by the War Office as serving with the forces at that 
time returned to Westminster to support the measure. Only four Service Members voted 
against the bill on its introduction, and only two of those maintained their opposition during 
its second and third readings.
56
 Some of the pro-conscription MPs of January 1916 (including 
Leo Amery) had previously been members of Lord Roberts’s National Service League, which 
had agitated for the introduction of compulsory military service before the war. Yet many 
others had expressed no sympathy for conscription prior to 1914, and the wartime conversion 
of Liberal MPs such as Guest to conscription was regarded as a highly significant 
development.
57
 Liberals came to support (or at least acquiesce in) the introduction of 
conscription in 1916 for a number of different reasons, but Guest himself frankly 
acknowledged that it was ‘my experience with the army in France [that] had convinced me 
against my will of the necessity for the immediate adoption of compulsory military service’.58 
Although some officers had initially expressed reservations about mixing ‘pressed men’ with 
the volunteers under their command, military opinion appeared to harden in favour of 
conscription during 1915—largely on the grounds that voluntary recruitment seemed no 
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longer able to bring in the numbers of recruits needed for the large-scale military operations 
that were now essential for the prosecution of the war.
59
 Guest was not alone in 
acknowledging this trend, and there was a conspicuous correlation within the parliamentary 
Liberal party between personal experience of military service and enthusiasm for 
conscription: 90 per cent of the Liberal MPs serving with the armed forces in January 1916 
who voted on the second reading of the Military Service Bill supported the measure. 
 
Three months after the passage of the Military Service Act, The Times reported that 
some fifty Service Members, from both of the main parties, had assembled for an informal 
meeting in the House of Commons to discuss the manpower question and express their 
frustration at perceived inadequacies in the implementation of conscription.
60
 In the face of 
mounting pressure, the Cabinet decided in May to introduce a second Military Service Bill, 
extending the application of compulsory service to married men. This bill also received 
substantial cross-party support from fighting MPs.
61
 In some respects, the Service Members 
were beginning to look rather like a coherent military ‘bloc’ in Parliament, a group whose 
shared military identity was capable of bridging the conventional divisions of party politics.
62
 
 
The willingness of fighting MPs to participate so conspicuously in the campaign for 
compulsory service proved to be highly controversial. King’s Regulations expressly 
prohibited officers from seeking to ‘prejudice questions which are under the consideration of 
superior military authority by the publication, anonymous or otherwise, of [their] opinions’. 
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The involvement of fighting MPs in the extra-parliamentary agitation for military compulsion 
was particularly questionable, since serving officers were forbidden from taking part in ‘any 
meetings, demonstrations, or processions, for party or political purposes ... wherever held, in 
uniform’.63 When H.J. Tennant had conceded in June 1915 that statements made by Service 
Members in the House of Commons might be protected by parliamentary ‘privilege’, he had 
specifically drawn a distinction ‘between statements made outside the walls of Parliament, 
and those made inside’.64 Opponents of conscription accused Service Members of breaching 
military discipline and introducing ‘contentious questions into the ranks of [the] Army in face 
of the enemy’.65 Fighting MPs who publicly advocated the introduction of compulsory 
service were not, however, subjected to any formal sanction by the military hierarchy for this 
breach of discipline. Indeed, the Army leadership seemed to approve strongly of their actions. 
Some commanders actively encouraged MPs serving under them to take leave from the front 
in order to join the political agitation for compulsory service. In 1916 Henry Page Croft was 
summoned before Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson, who informed the MP in plain 
terms: ‘I asked you to come here to tell you that I consider it to be your bounden duty to 
return to the House of Commons and do everything in your power to get these manpower 
measures passed’.66 Some months earlier Leo Amery had been reassigned by his military 
chief, General Charles Callwell, to the Balkan section at the War Office in London in order 
that Amery might better co-ordinate the parliamentary and press agitation in favour of 
conscription.
67
 In April 1916, when the government was coming under increasing pressure to 
extend the application of compulsory service to married men, General Rawlinson, the 
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commander of the Fourth Army, wrote to tell Amery that ‘I have already sent round to all my 
MPs to say they may have leave to go and vote for you in the House’.68 
 
The perception that senior generals were attempting to influence Parliament’s 
consideration of conscription by directing the votes of MPs serving under their command 
provoked outrage in many quarters—most especially among more orthodox-minded Liberals 
who were, in any case, unenthusiastic about the war. The Nation denounced the involvement 
of serving soldiers in the political campaign for compulsory service as frankly 
‘unconstitutional’, and in June 1915 the Bradford MP Sir George Scott Robertson warned the 
government of ‘a general feeling of uneasiness in the country that officers of the headquarters 
staff ... are acting as mouthpieces of the Field-Marshal commanding in France’.69 
 
It would be wrong, however, to see the Service Members simply as political 
instruments in the hands of the high command. MPs in the armed forces did not always 
follow unquestioningly the political wishes of their commanders; nor was their attitude 
towards the military establishment invariably uncritical. By the summer of 1916 Britain’s 
record in the war was certainly open to criticism. In July, two months after the British 
garrison under General Townshend at Kut-al-Amara had surrendered to the Turks and six 
months after the evacuation of British and ANZAC troops from the Gallipoli peninsula, 
Asquith announced the government’s decision to appoint two special commissions of inquiry 
into the failure of the military campaigns in Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles.
70
 Service 
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Members who gave evidence before these commissions did not shrink from criticising 
mismanagement or incompetence on the part of the responsible military authorities. Aubrey 
Herbert and George Lloyd gave scathing accounts of the shortcomings in transport, sanitation 
and medical provision that they had witnessed in Mesopotamia.
71
 Leslie Wilson, who had led 
a battalion of the Royal Naval Division at Gallipoli, went further and directly criticised the 
methods of his commanding officer, Lieutenant-General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, the 
commander of 8
th
 Corps. Wilson accused Hunter-Weston of failing to make himself or his 
staff ‘acquainted with the actual conditions which existed’ in the trenches, and of ordering a 
series of disastrous and ill-planned frontal attacks, ‘without adequate artillery preparation’, in 
which the men had effectively been ‘asked to face almost certain death with no good object in 
the end’.72 
 
These formal inquiries into the causes of publicly acknowledged military debacles did 
not represent the only opportunity available to Service Members to give voice to their 
opinions on the conduct and capabilities of their superior officers. Many MPs serving with 
the forces maintained close contact with political colleagues in Westminster and Whitehall, 
even while on active duty, and these men were in a uniquely privileged position to provide 
senior politicians at home with a first-hand perspective on the conduct of operations. During 
the early months of the war, for example, the Unionist MP John Baird sent frequent private 
reports on the military situation from his post at the British headquarters staff in France to 
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Bonar Law in London.
73
 Similarly, through the summer of 1915, George Lloyd reported 
directly to the new Secretary of State for India, Austen Chamberlain, offering his views on 
the British progress at Gallipoli, ‘such as it appears to the ordinary individual engaged in the 
campaign’.74 Military commanders were often aware of such correspondence, and some were 
willing to use MPs serving under them as an informal channel of communication with the 
political authorities at home.
75
 In June 1915 Arthur Lee sent a long and detailed letter to 
Chamberlain, reporting the views of various senior staff officers with whom Lee had been in 
‘confidential and constant touch’, and who had been willing to ‘unburden their minds to me 
with very little reserve and in many cases with the expressed desire that I should speak on 
their behalf’.76 
 
However, since MPs’ letters were (theoretically) free from the scrutiny of the military 
censor, they also represented a means of bypassing the formal chain of command, and many 
MPs displayed a remarkable lack of deference to their military superiors in their letters and 
reports. Lee’s letter to Chamberlain dwelt at some length upon the damage to Britain’s 
military efforts being wrought by the poor personal relationship between Field Marshals 
French and Kitchener, and expressed considerable alarm at the rumour that the new 
commander of the Third Army might be Sir Arthur Paget—a man whom Lee claimed, ‘is 
both mentally and physically unfit for a task of such size and gravity’. Similar sentiments 
appeared in the correspondence of Jack Gilmour, who wrote from Gallipoli to Edmund 
Talbot in November 1915, complaining about ‘the fearful lack of organisation’ in the 
campaign, and about the presence on the headquarters staff of men who ‘do not know their 
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job’.77 After the 46th Division suffered terrible losses in a disastrous attack on the 
Hohenzollern Redoubt during the battle of Loos in October 1915, Josiah Wedgwood wrote 
directly to Asquith, calling for the immediate dismissal of two of the generals—Haking and 
Stuart-Wortley—whom he regarded as responsible.78 By May 1918 Jack Seely, who had for 
some time been deriding the high command as ‘wooden and unreceptive to modern ideas’, 
was calling privately for the removal of Field Marshal Haig and his staff.
79
 
 
Of course, letters between MPs in the forces and Cabinet ministers in London hardly 
represented the only source of unfavourable comment on the conduct of British military 
operations by this stage of the war. Sir Ian Hamilton, the British general in command at 
Gallipoli, was initially more concerned about the criticisms being voiced by newspaper war 
correspondents such as Ellis Ashmead-Bartlet, who denounced the direction of operations in 
the Dardanelles in a series of damning reports, interviews and lectures, prompting Hamilton 
to complain to the War Office: ‘I should not be hung, drawn and quartered by an 
irresponsible journalist before I have had an opportunity of stating my case’.80 Many 
journalists, however, believed that Members of Parliament—and Service Members in 
particular—were better placed than themselves to provide effective scrutiny and criticism of 
the military conduct of the war. In November 1917 Lovat Fraser of the Daily Mail wrote to 
Wedgwood, complaining that wartime press censorship meant that journalists who wished to 
challenge or expose military failures were ‘all gagged’, and urging that ‘only Parliament’ 
could defeat the invidious and ‘grossly unconstitutional’ attempts being made by those in 
authority ‘to suggest that a couple of mediocre soldiers [Haig and ‘Wully’ Robertson, the 
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chief of the imperial general staff] are to dispose of all the manhood of the country without 
scrutiny’.81 
 
MPs certainly enjoyed a privileged platform from which to criticise the military 
establishment, and many were more than willing to make use of it. The inquiries into the 
failings of the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia campaigns were established at least in part as a 
result of pressure from Service Members within the House of Commons. Wedgwood had 
urged in November 1915 that ‘the House and the country should be assured that these men 
who conducted those Forces to disaster are no longer in a position of command’, and was 
relentless in calling for ‘the weeding out of the bad generals’.82 Maurice Hankey, the 
Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, was convinced that Aubrey Herbert, 
similarly, was out ‘to get some general’s head on a charger’.83 
 
The relationship between the Service Members and the military establishment was 
therefore a complex and potentially fraught one. Some fighting MPs—particularly those 
serving as staff officers—seemed determined to protect both the personal reputations and the 
operational autonomy of senior commanders against any external criticism or interference. 
Freddie Guest was a violent critic of the ‘reckless ignorance’ which he believed to have 
characterised criticism of his chief, Field Marshal French, late in 1915.
84
 Similarly, 
Lieutenant Philip Sassoon, who served as secretary to French’s successor Sir Douglas Haig, 
argued at a public meeting in Folkestone in January 1917 that, ‘if we trusted our soldiers, if 
we trusted our generals, and above all our Commander-in-Chief, and gave him and them a 
free hand, untrammelled by pettifogging considerations of home politics, we could await the 
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future with calm confidence’.85 During the following year, as sharp divisions over the 
strategic direction of the war emerged between Lloyd George (by now Prime Minister) and 
senior commanders such as Haig and Robertson, a number of Service Members chose to 
defend the generals against what they saw as political meddling in the conduct of the war.
86
  
 
Other Service Members, however, were at pains to assert the supremacy of civilian 
political authority over the military establishment. In May 1918, when Asquith attempted to 
move a parliamentary vote of censure against Lloyd George after General Frederick Maurice 
had accused the Prime Minister of weakening the British army on the western front and 
subsequently misleading Parliament over the matter, Josiah Wedgwood (although no admirer 
of the government by this time) berated Asquith for ‘backing up the “Red Tabs” [ie, staff 
officers] against the civilians’.87 Many Service Members, indeed, appeared to regard it as 
their particular duty to champion the cause of parliamentary oversight and control over the 
armed forces. As Wedgwood subsequently claimed in his memoirs, the ‘fighting MP of 1914 
had been almost instigated to take a larger view of his duties and functions. He was in the 
Army or Navy to see for the Administration and to report fearlessly to Parliament, as well as 
to take the normal risk of the soldier’. Wedgwood himself was in no doubt as to the 
effectiveness of scrutiny of this kind: ‘The old days of the free hand for the fighting services 
vanished. Fighting was no longer a mystery reserved for high priests. Parliament was in it all, 
and knew too much for the survival of any mysteries or illusions’.88  To some observers, this 
talk of parliamentary interference in military operations evoked memories of the 
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représentants en mission of the French Revolution in the 1790s.
89
 Wedgwood preferred 
another comparison, describing himself and his fellow Service Members as ‘the British 
equivalent of the Soviet Commissars, using the Press, the platform, the House, and private 
appreciations—to the rage and despair of all Brasshattery’.90 
 
Whether Service Members were as effective in this role in practice as Wedgwood 
later claimed is open to question. The military establishment was certainly capable of 
ignoring parliamentary criticism. Wedgwood’s own demands for the dismissal of generals 
Haking and Stuart-Wortley in November 1915 were thwarted by Haig, who assured Asquith 
that the disastrous reverses suffered by the 46
th
 Division at Loos were the result of a lack of 
discipline and ‘general ignorance of war conditions’ among the Territorial soldiers in the 
division, rather than any failure on the part of senior commanders.
91
 The ‘rage and despair’—
or, at least, the irritation and indignation—that the activities of some Service Members 
provoked in the high command, however, were certainly evident. On one occasion, after 
offering his private views on the military situation to Bonar Law during a visit to London, 
Henry Page Croft was hauled before his divisional general and sternly rebuked for ignoring 
the military chain of command.
92
 In April 1918 the problem of Service Members apparently 
breaching military discipline by criticising the conduct of their superior officers was 
addressed by Lloyd George directly in the Commons: 
 
[This] was one of the first questions brought to my notice when I was 
Secretary of State for War in the late Administration. The Army Council 
called my attention to the fact that there were several Members of 
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Parliament who were serving in the Army, and who were utilising 
knowledge which they got as officers in the Army in order to criticise Army 
administration in this House, and they said, ‘This is extremely unfair to the 
Higher Command. It is extremely unfair to those who have the direction of 
the Army ... It is quite impossible to maintain the discipline of any force 
under those conditions.’93 
 
II 
The Service Members, then, occupied a unique and controversial position both in Parliament 
and in the armed forces. At times they could act as a bridge between the military and 
civilian–political elites, but their activities could also prove destabilising to both 
establishments. The significance of these men during the Great War, however, lay not only in 
the realm of civil–military relations. Their activities—indeed, their very existence—also 
raised profound questions about the nature of political authority and representative 
‘democracy’ in Britain. 
 
As already noted, Service Members who spoke in Parliament during the war often 
attempted to base their political authority on their status ‘as soldiers’—that is, as experts (at 
least in the context of the House of Commons) on military questions. But there was also an 
important sense in which many fighting MPs claimed to be speaking on behalf of the 
soldiers.
94
 In doing so, these men were not simply presenting themselves as spokesmen for 
the high command, but rather were posing as the political representatives of ordinary soldiers 
in the trenches. In this sense, even a perennial critic of the generals such as Wedgwood could 
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declare himself to be ‘absolutely convinced ... that there should be a free and frank expression 
in this House of the views of the Army in the field’.95 
 
The argument that MPs might represent particular ‘interests’ in Parliament was 
certainly not without precedent—landowning MPs often spoke for the landed interest, for 
example, while the Labour Party had operated before 1914 effectively as a vehicle for trade-
union interests. Yet the idea that Service Members might claim to speak ‘for the soldiers’ at 
Westminster was always likely to prove controversial. As Asquith pointedly reminded the 
Commons in September 1915, ‘the Army as an Army has no representation in this House’; 
MPs sat in Parliament to represent the constituents who returned them, and British 
constitutional convention recognised no other mandate that they might claim.
96
 
Unfortunately, the war had thrown the British system of representative politics into 
confusion. By 1914, some 84 per cent of electors qualified for the parliamentary franchise as 
a consequence of having been householders of a separate dwelling place for a continuous 
period of twelve months.
97
 Electors in this category who volunteered to fight abroad during 
the war quickly forfeited their place on the electoral register, with the result, as Wedgwood 
observed, that there were soon 
millions of electors ... who are accidentally deprived of the franchise in this 
country, but who are none the less citizens of the country, and who ought to 
be able to influence the views of Members of Parliament in the only way in 
which they can do so. ... Through their officers, or by such means as are 
open to them.
98
 
 
The argument that these circumstances entitled Service Members to claim political authority 
as representatives of the views of soldiers in the trenches remained problematic, however, for 
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a number of reasons. One was the continued purchase in British political culture of the 
Burkean idea that an MP was not simply a ‘delegate’ for the views of his electors, but rather 
was expected to act in Parliament according to his own conscience and judgment.
99
 More 
importantly, the precise relationship between the electorate and the army during the war 
remained obscure. After all, a great many of the soldiers fighting in the trenches had not 
qualified for the parliamentary franchise before 1914. This issue assumed considerable 
practical importance when the government, anxious to avoid a wartime general election, and 
particularly one conducted on the basis of an incomplete register, appointed a special 
conference, chaired by the Speaker of the House of Commons, to examine the question of 
electoral reform.  
 
In this way, it has been argued that the experience of war prompted a profound 
renegotiation of the concept of political citizenship in Britain. This is often seen as a process 
of straightforward ‘democratisation’, marked by a rapid and dramatic widening of the 
franchise following the passage of the Representation of the People Act in 1918. In fact, the 
wartime redrawing of the boundaries of political citizenship was a complex process, shaped 
by a range of conflicting dynamics, both inclusive and exclusive. As Nicoletta Gullace has 
observed, from the early months of the conflict onwards, a vast array of official and 
unofficial recruiting propaganda lionised the soldiery while turning unenlisted men—
increasingly seen as ‘slackers’—into national pariahs. This created an atmosphere that not 
only served to justify the introduction of conscription in 1916, but also fuelled calls for 
reforms that would give soldiers greater political power. At the same time, the war provided 
women with opportunities to advance their own claims to citizenship, both by emphasising 
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their practical contributions to the war effort—for example in munitions factories, on the land 
or through bodies such as the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps and the Voluntary Aid 
Detachments—and by invoking a powerful rhetoric of personal sacrifice rooted in the 
concept of ‘patriotic motherhood’. More controversially, the failure or refusal of significant 
numbers of British men to fulfil their supposed obligation to the state by joining the armed 
forces (whether on the grounds of their age, medical condition or conscientious objection to 
military service) allowed ‘patriotic’ women to challenge established notions that citizenship 
was ineluctably tied to the male body. The consequence, Gullace argues, was that ‘during the 
war, sacrifice, service, and British blood began to take precedence over sex, property, and 
legal majority, while patriotism replaced manhood as the fundamental qualification for the 
parliamentary vote’.100 
 
The idea of a connection between military service and political citizenship was 
endorsed enthusiastically by an overwhelming majority of wartime Service Members, 
although the precise nature of that relationship was not always clear. Was it, for example, a 
question of ‘rewarding’ patriotic activities at a time of national crisis, or simply a way of 
acknowledging the capacity for responsible citizenship supposedly demonstrated by military 
service? For example, Sir William Bull, the MP for Hammersmith who took a commission as 
Honorary Commandant of a battalion of the London Volunteer Regiment in January 1918, 
appeared to favour extending the franchise to soldiers who had enlisted voluntarily in the 
armed forces, but not to those who had been conscripted after January 1916.
101
 Captain Hugh 
O’Neill, the MP for Antrim, initially wanted to extend voting rights only to soldiers who had 
undertaken active service abroad, arguing that the next Parliament ‘should be elected by the 
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men who have made the greatest sacrifices’ in wartime.102 Most Service Members, however, 
supported an amendment moved by Colonel Leslie Wilson calling for the extension of the 
franchise to all men who had served in the forces and were over the age of nineteen years, on 
the simple grounds that ‘if the State considers a man of nineteen old enough to go out and 
fight for his country surely he is old enough to have a vote for his country’. This proposal, 
which was finally confirmed in the Representation of the People Bill at its Report Stage, went 
considerably further than some members of the Coalition government had intended in 
1917.
103
 It also represented a striking innovation in British constitutional practice, since, by 
allowing men who had served in the armed forces to vote at an age two years below their 
civilian counterparts, the Bill effectively created a new and privileged class of military 
elector. Service Members were also conspicuous in endorsing the more exclusionary and 
restrictive implications of a franchise based on ‘patriotic’ service to the state. Fighting MPs 
were particularly prominent in the political campaign to deny the vote to conscientious 
objectors, on the grounds, as Major Rowland Hunt put it, that such individuals ‘have no right 
to claim any share in governing the country which they refuse to defend’.104  
 
What Gullace calls the ‘cultural construction of the law’ during the war was not, 
however, a smooth or uncontested process. The idea that political citizenship might be a 
corollary of military service in Britain was not entirely novel in 1917. Before the war, some 
members of the National Service League had argued that ‘the creation of a system of general 
service would necessarily involve the granting of the electoral suffrage to all men who had 
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passed through the ranks’.105 Yet such ideas had remained confined to the political fringe, and 
the British electoral system recognised no connection between military service and 
citizenship.
106
 Opposition to the idea of military service as a prerequisite of political 
citizenship persisted in influential quarters during the war, with members of both major 
political parties expressing reservations on the question. Thomas Lough, the Liberal MP for 
Islington, warned that the extension of special privileges to military voters would be ‘a great 
triumph for militarism’.107 At the same time, while many Unionists calculated that an 
expanded (and supposedly ‘patriotic’) service vote would provide a useful counterweight to 
the trade-union interest in the electorate, there were influential Conservatives who remained 
opposed to the enfranchisement of soldiers on a privileged basis.
108
 Lord Selborne regarded 
the pressure to grant the vote to soldiers at a younger age than civilians as ‘mischievous 
sentimentalism of the worst sort’.109 Sir Frederick Banbury agreed, urging MPs to remember 
that the vote was neither ‘a privilege [nor] a reward’, but rather ‘a duty which is imposed only 
on those who are fit to carry it out’. Banbury argued that ‘nobody is fit to exercise a vote at 
nineteen’, and that there was certainly no reason to suppose that a ‘boy’ who had undertaken 
military service was any more qualified to discharge the responsibilities of the elector than, 
for instance, one who had taken honours at Oxford.
110
 For this he was attacked by the Liberal 
Service Member Major-General Ivor Philipps, who accused Banbury of privileging 
‘property’ over patriotic service and sacrifice as a basis for citizenship.111 
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Once again, therefore, divisions between civilians and soldiers within Parliament 
appeared to be blurring the traditional fault lines of party politics. This was particularly 
evident over the question of restrictions to the franchise. An early attempt to strip 
conscientious objectors of the vote was blocked in July 1917 by the Home Secretary Sir 
George Cave and the government Whips. But on 21 November a free vote on the question 
was allowed, and the House of Commons narrowly approved an amendment disenfranchising 
all men who had been accepted by military service tribunals as ‘genuine’ conscientious 
objectors, by 209 votes to 171. An analysis of the votes cast in this division is revealing: MPs 
who had served in the forces during the war backed the measure overwhelmingly, by eighty-
two votes to twenty-eight, but civilian MPs actually opposed the disenfranchisement of 
conscientious objectors by a majority of 143 votes to 127.
112
 Just as they had during the 
campaign for the introduction of military conscription, there is evidence that Service 
Members from different parties were actively co-ordinating their efforts in the debates about 
electoral reform.
113
 Indeed, some openly claimed that they were campaigning for the interests 
of soldiers against a class of ‘civilian’ politicians who had contributed less than themselves to 
the war effort. Major Hunt went so far as to warn his colleagues in the House of Commons 
that ‘if you politicians do not take care, the soldiers and sailors, when they find they have not 
got the vote to help in ruling their country … may take the power themselves, and I am not 
sure they would not be right’.114 
 
Similar tensions were evident in the debate over women’s suffrage. Perhaps more 
than any other, this issue reveals the complex nature of the relationship between the changes 
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in political culture wrought by the war and the construction of the post-war electoral system. 
The patriotic contributions of women to the war effort were widely invoked by previously 
sceptical politicians in order to explain their conversion to the cause of women’s suffrage by 
1918. Yet in practice, of course, the Representation of the People Act extended the vote to 
women only on a very limited basis. Most conspicuously, by restricting the franchise to 
women aged over thirty, the Act created an electorate that actually excluded a majority of 
those women who had worked in the munitions factories during the war. This gulf between 
rhetoric and legislative reality would seem to confirm Martin Pugh’s observation that, in its 
practical details, the Reform Bill that finally passed Parliament reflected pragmatic 
considerations of party advantage and political compromise more than any coherent theory of 
political citizenship.
115
 Yet this issue also reveals the extent to which concepts such as 
‘service’ and ‘citizenship’ (and the relationship between the two) remained contested, even 
within the context of the political culture of wartime Britain. 
 
Gullace has argued that women’s war work provided a ‘major catalyst’ in the final 
achievement of women’s suffrage because it effectively demolished the old ‘physical force’ 
argument, widely used by Victorian anti-suffragists, that women should not be able to vote 
because they could not contribute to the defence of their country.
116
 In other words, even if it 
did not lead to full political equality for women in 1918, the conspicuous contribution of 
women in vital war industries was essential to the final victory of the suffrage campaign 
because it deprived the anti-suffragist case of its ‘driving logic’.117 A significant number of 
MPs, however, including a disproportionate number of Service Members, continued to 
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oppose women’s suffrage throughout the war precisely on the basis of the ‘physical force’ 
issue.
118
 The central argument in this case was that only military service to the state justified 
the bestowal of full rights of citizenship. For fighting MPs such as Arnold Ward, the son of 
the successful novelist and anti-suffragist Mrs Humphry Ward and an inveterate opponent of 
women’s suffrage in his own right, the vital consideration by 1917 was ‘the fact that the 
women of this country have not fought’. In the vast military operations connected with the 
war, he argued, ‘the work of men has been decisive and the work of women has been 
auxiliary’; for this reason, ‘the position of women in politics ought to continue to be an 
auxiliary one’ also.119 Such outright opposition to women’s suffrage was, by the summer of 
1917, clearly doomed. Yet the persistence of the ‘physical force’ argument to oppose a 
women’s franchise reveals the extent to which talk of a straightforward correlation between 
‘service’ and ‘citizenship’ by 1918 is misleading. In fact, the wartime process of 
‘democratisation’ always contained new hierarchies of citizenship; these were contested 
fiercely during the war, and were reflected only imperfectly in the Representation of the 
People Act itself. 
 
Controversial as such questions were, the definition of ‘citizenship’ was not the only 
issue at stake in the wartime debates about political representation. Just as they had in their 
support for a soldiers’ franchise and their hostility towards conscientious objectors, Service 
Members who opposed women’s suffrage claimed to be representing the views of ordinary 
                                                          
118
 The crucial parliamentary division took place on 19 June 1917, when the House of Commons approved 
Clause Four of the Representation of the People Bill, extending the vote to women, by 387 votes to 57. A 
majority of MPs who had served in the forces supported the measure, but Service Members provided almost half 
of the votes—and most of the rhetorical ammunition—against women’s suffrage. It was also widely noted that a 
significant number of MPs opposed to women’s suffrage were absent from Parliament on military operations, 
and were therefore unable to vote in the division: Hansard, Commons, 28 Mar. 1917, vol. 92, col. 499; 19 June 
1917, vol. 94, cols. 1739, 1742–3, 1902; Times, 20 June 1917. 
119
 Hansard, Commons, 28 Mar. 1917, vol. 92, cols. 497–8. Service Members espousing this line typically 
supported the disenfranchisement of conscientious objectors, but did not usually acknowledge another logical 
implication of their case: that men whose own contribution to the war effort had been of a civilian character, or 
who had other justifications for not fighting—such as age—should also be excluded from the electorate. 
 38 
 
members of the armed forces. Many expressed outrage that Parliament should attempt to 
make such a ‘vast and enormous change’ to the constitution ‘without consulting the flower of 
our manhood, who ought to be the real rulers of this country’.120 Indeed, some fighting MPs 
presented women’s suffrage as a positive (if vaguely-defined) threat to the interests of 
servicemen, and denounced the reform as a step which would ‘place upon the register a mass 
of necessarily inexperienced voters liable to be swayed by the arguments of hysterical 
agitators and consequently liable to use the vote to the detriment of the interests of our 
soldiers and sailors’.121 
 
These attacks on the decision of Parliament to address questions such as women’s suffrage 
without ‘consulting’ the nation’s soldiers and sailors touched upon another important 
problem in British wartime politics, namely, the authority of the House of Commons itself. 
The idea that the armed forces represented a corporate interest whose views deserved special 
parliamentary consideration was a highly contentious one. Calls from Service Members for 
Parliament to introduce conscription because it was ‘what the Army wants’ had provoked 
controversy, but the increasing insistence of fighting MPs that the armed forces had a right to 
be consulted, not only on military matters but also on broader questions of political reform, 
was more worrying still.
122
 Many critics regarded this as a dangerous and incongruous 
intrusion by the military power into the political arena, and comparisons were drawn with the 
Cromwellian army’s usurpation of political power during the seventeenth century.123 
 
Not all observers, however, saw the Service Members as harbingers of a military 
challenge to the political authority of Parliament. Indeed, this controversy needs to be 
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understood within the context of a broader ‘crisis’ of political authority in Britain during the 
war. As John Horne has observed, the Great War both revealed and heightened one of the 
fundamental paradoxes in the emergence of the modern state: bureaucratisation and 
technology vastly extended the state’s capacity for surveillance and repression, but mass 
involvement in the political process simultaneously made ‘legitimacy’, the consent of the 
ruled, an increasingly vital condition of the state’s effective operation.124 Exceptional 
wartime legislation—including the subjection of millions of men to military discipline—
enhanced the coercive powers of the state; yet the waging of total war in an industrial age 
also required an unprecedented level of commitment and active participation on the part of 
ordinary citizens. Sustaining this popular commitment became increasingly difficult as the 
war continued, and Brock Millman has argued that the British government increasingly fell 
back on the ruthless suppression of domestic dissent during the second half of the war, even 
resorting to collaboration with freelance right-wing ‘patriot gangs’ in a counter-revolutionary 
conspiracy against pacifist and socialist elements.
125
 
 
However, it can be argued that consent remained at least as important as coercion in 
the British state’s management of the home front. By the summer of 1917, following the 
February Revolution in Russia, reports of mutinies in the French army and a wave of strikes 
at home, the political authorities in Britain had become convinced that new efforts were 
needed in order to stave off a collapse in civilian morale. A cross-party parliamentary 
organisation, the National War Aims Committee (NWAC), was established, with the task of 
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‘remobilising’ Britain for the continued prosecution of the war.126 The NWAC organized an 
extensive campaign of propaganda, exploiting the resonance of a variety of forms of popular 
patriotism, including appeals to spirituality, sacrifice, civic duty, local and regional 
affiliations—and even a form of ‘supra-national’ patriotism which presented the western 
allies as engaged in a collective defence of ‘civilisation’ and ‘democracy’.127 Within this 
latter context, the NWAC consistently sought to present Britain as primus inter pares by 
espousing a form of ‘proprietorial patriotism’ that emphasised the nation’s long heritage of 
liberty and ‘democratic’ institutions, and placed particular weight on the contemporary 
significance of Parliament as ‘the great centre of civic liberty’.128 
 
Unfortunately, the reputation and authority of the Westminster Parliament seemed 
less secure by 1917 than had been the case in living memory. Disillusionment with the 
political status quo in Britain was reflected in the votes cast for a series of radical right-wing 
candidates in by-elections during the second half of the war, and in the emergence of such 
groups as the British Empire Union and the Vigilantes, who expressed opposition to what 
they regarded as the corruption and weakness of the political establishment. By May 1918 
Horatio Bottomley, the demagogic editor of John Bull, was predicting ‘the impending 
collapse of parliamentary government’, and Adrian Gregory has suggested that the final year 
of the war witnessed the emergence of something resembling ‘an embryonic mass-fascist 
movement’, which only failed to coalesce because of the rapidity with which the final 
military victory arrived.
129
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To a certain extent, this disenchantment with parliamentary government represented 
just one manifestation of a more general ‘war weariness’, and a frustration at the apparent 
inability of Britain’s political and military leaders to bring the war to a successful conclusion. 
But there were also more particular reasons for the wartime decline in Parliament’s political 
standing. Part of the problem lay in the way in which the war appeared to deprive the House 
of Commons of one of its most important functions: providing effective scrutiny of the 
ministerial executive. As The Times observed in an editorial in August 1915, following the 
outbreak of hostilities the government had been ‘entrusted by common consent with 
autocratic powers. Parliament could do little, and attempted little, but to confirm its actions. 
… Gigantic Votes of Credit had only to be named to be passed by acclamation’.130 The 
weakness of the Commons was exacerbated by the formation of the coalition government in 
May 1915, which (at least in the short term) effectively removed the prospect of ministers 
being held to account by an organised parliamentary opposition. At the same time, the 
government’s reluctance to risk a general election in wartime severely undermined 
Parliament’s authority as the ‘representative’ organ of the state: by the end of the war the 
House of Commons had not refreshed its electoral mandate for almost eight years. 
 
In this context, it was possible to regard the parliamentary activities of Service 
Members in a far more favourable light. As The Times was quick to point out, effective 
criticism of ministerial shortcomings remained essential during the war, yet Parliament’s 
ability to fulfil this function had been undermined precisely by ‘the absence [at the Front] of 
the very men who could advise it best’. Rather than threatening the independence of the 
House of Commons, political interventions by soldier-MPs could be presented as essential to 
the proper functioning of Parliament in wartime, and the patriotic press responded 
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enthusiastically on the occasions when ‘the sudden appearance of one of these bronzed and 
bearded warriors has transformed an academic debate and brought it back to reality’. Indeed, 
by the end of 1916, influential civilian figures, including the former Liberal Chief Whip Lord 
Murray of Elibank, were calling for a general recall of Service Members to Parliament in 
order to ensure that the House of Commons was able to discharge its vital duties 
effectively.
131
 
 
The activities of Service Members also proved important in wartime debates about 
Parliament’s authority as a ‘representative’ institution. Claims by individual Service 
Members to possess a political mandate from the troops at the front were undoubtedly 
controversial. But the idea that the House of Commons should contain no representation of 
the views of serving soldiers raised problems of its own. Not least among these was the 
possibility that service personnel who felt excluded from the parliamentary process might 
turn to alternative modes of political action. Following the revolution in Russia, the British 
government came to view with increasing concern the activities of such domestic groups as 
the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilized Sailors and Soldiers, which agitated 
for better welfare provision for veterans and against the forcible re-enlistment of men 
previously discharged from the armed forces, under the leadership of the left-wing Liberal 
MPs James Hogge and William Pringle. Even groups on the radical right of the political 
spectrum, such as the British Workers League, which claimed to represent the interests of 
‘patriots’ and soldiers, and engaged in the violent disruption of pacifist and socialist 
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meetings, came to be viewed as a threat to political stability and national unity.
132
 Super-
patriots such as Rowland Hunt might appear to welcome the prospect of frustrated soldiers 
‘taking power themselves’, but for more mainstream politicians of both left and right the 
potential consequences of widespread alienation from parliamentary politics among members 
of the armed force provided reason enough to ensure that soldiers had a voice inside the 
House of Commons. 
 
There was also a broader question of political principle. The Victorian norm of 
seeking effectively to exclude the military from the political arena had been defensible as 
long as the army had remained a small professional force, largely removed from civilian 
society. It became more difficult to justify in the context of a war in which the British army, 
for the first time, could reasonably be described as a true ‘citizen force’: between 1914 and 
1918 some 5,700,000 men—more than 22 per cent of the adult male population—passed 
through the ranks of the armed forces, and many observers argued that a truly ‘representative’ 
Parliament must allow some expression of their views.
133
 By 1917, even an unimpeachable 
Liberal such as Arthur Ponsonby could be found arguing that the ‘full participation [of 
soldiers] in the formation and direction’ of Parliament was now ‘an absolute essential’.134 
This was not simply a matter of directing the war effort effectively. The Times had argued in 
August 1915 that ‘it would be grotesque that the House of Commons should decide such a 
question as National Service without the assistance of its citizen soldiers, who represent the 
best element in our manhood, [and] know the needs and wishes of the Army at first hand’. 
Significantly, however, the newspaper also argued that the ability of Service Members to 
                                                          
132
 D. Thackeray, ‘Building a Peaceable Party: Masculine Identities in British Conservative Politics, c.1903–
1924’, Historical Research, lxxxv (2012), pp. 659–61; J. Lawrence, ‘Public Space, Political Space’, in Winter 
and Robert, eds., Capital Cities at War ii. 294–99. 
133
 P. Simkins, ‘The Four Armies, 1914–1918’, in D.G. Chandler and I. Beckett, eds., The Oxford History of the 
British Army, (Oxford, 1996), p. 235. 
134
 Nation, 15 Sept. 1917. 
 44 
 
speak ‘on behalf’ of the vast numbers of men serving in the trenches was no less vital in 
Parliament’s consideration of broader questions of national policy. Matters such as taxation, 
for example, or the feasibility of free trade, ‘are not primarily military questions, but they are 
fundamental questions of national security which cannot be settled satisfactorily by an 
unrepresentative House of Commons’.135 Similarly, the work of post-war social 
reconstruction could only be approached by ‘a fully representative Parliament’, and in this the 
contribution of the fighting MPs, who alone ‘are in touch with that large and select part of the 
nation which now constitutes the Army’, was vital.136 It was no coincidence that calls for a 
general recall of Service Members to Westminster increased as politicians began to turn their 
minds to the problems that Britain would face after the hoped-for military victory.  
 
The Service Members themselves were more than happy to invoke their military 
credentials during the short campaign which preceded the general election in December 1918. 
Even those MPs whose wartime service had been of a largely administrative nature made 
liberal use of their military rank and uniform in election propaganda.
137
 In doing so they were 
equating martial or ‘masculine’ virtues with a measure of fitness for office.138 But they were 
also deliberately presenting themselves both as ‘Trustees for the Silent’ (i.e. the war dead) 
and as guardians of the rights of returning servicemen. What the ordinary members of the 
armed forces made of such tactics is not easy to discern; the low turnout by service personnel 
in the ‘Khaki’ election suggests a significant level of apathy—or at least disengagement from 
the parliamentary process—among soldiers awaiting demobilisation. Yet the wider electorate 
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responded positively towards those MPs claiming to represent the interests of men coming 
home from the trenches. Of 176 wartime Service Members who sought re-election in 1918, 
152 were returned, most of them with the benefit of the ‘coupon’ awarded to supporters of 
the Lloyd George coalition.
139
 The addition of a cohort of newly-elected MPs brought the 
number of military veterans in the post-war House of Commons to more than 250.
140
  
 
Rather than threatening the independence and authority of a ‘civilian’ Parliament, 
therefore, the presence of military officers in the House of Commons was widely regarded as 
essential to the preservation of a competent, functioning and truly ‘representative’ political 
institution. Indeed, ex-servicemen retained a significant and conspicuous presence in the 
House of Commons throughout the inter-war period, even as elite concerns about the 
‘brutalising’ effects of the war fostered new concerns about veteran involvement in public 
politics.
141
 
 
 
 
 
The debate about parliamentary authority epitomised the paradoxes that surrounded the 
activities of the Service Members during the Great War. The unprecedented demands of 
waging total war rendered this an unusually fraught period in British civil–military relations. 
Despite the animosity that developed during the second half of the war between Lloyd 
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George and some of his most senior generals, however, there was never any serious prospect 
of Robertson, Haig or any other military figure establishing himself as a British Hindenburg 
or Ludendorff.
142
 In this sense the British claim to be fighting a war for civilian and 
constitutional standards of government against the ‘militarism’ represented by the German 
empire was not without merit. Yet, the presence of the Service Members in the House of 
Commons revealed just how far the British political class was itself from being a truly 
‘civilian’ entity. The willingness of fighting MPs from across the political spectrum to co-
operate in advancing what appeared to be a ‘military’ agenda at Westminster—most 
controversially in their demands for the introduction of conscription—alarmed critics who 
feared that the Service Members had allowed themselves to become the political instruments 
of the military high command. Yet many soldier-MPs saw themselves, on the contrary, as 
agents of parliamentary control over the armed forces, and individuals such as Josiah 
Wedgwood clearly relished their ability to frustrate both the ambitions and the operational 
autonomy of the professional military establishment. The insistence of military officers in the 
House of Commons that Parliament acknowledge a connection between military service and 
the franchise heralded the creation of a militarised and potentially restrictive new vision of 
political citizenship. Yet, ultimately, this vision was subsumed—albeit untidily—within the 
broader (and incomplete) democratisation of politics that was one of the Great War’s most 
important domestic legacies in Britain. Perhaps most ironically of all, however, in this war 
for civilian and constitutional standards of government, against the evils of ‘Prussian 
militarism’, the presence of a military cohort within the House of Commons came to be seen 
in many quarters as essential to maintaining the authority of Parliament itself. 
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